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ABSTRACT
A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION ON FRAMING 
And the Frame Through Deconstruction
Zehra Begüm Bengi 
M F. A. in Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Nezih Erdoğan 
August, 1999
This study aims at investigating deconstruction, and how a theoretical discussion on 
framing may be arrived at through such an investigation. For this pupose, some o f 
the concepts such as ‘ logocentricm’, ‘differance’, ‘iterability’, and ‘arche-writing’, 
which had been named as such by Jacques Derrida, are traced through his related 
texts, as one possible thread among others, and are concidered as that from which a 
theoretical conclusion on ‘ framing’ can be extracted.
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ÇERÇEVELEM E ÜZERİNE KURAM SAL BİR TARTIŞMA 
Yapıbozumu’nda Çerçeve
Zehra Begüm Bengi 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü
Yüksek Lisans
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Ağustos, 1999
Bu çalışmada yapıbozumu ve yapıbozumu yolu ile kuramsal bir çerçeveleme 
tartışmasına nasıl ulaşılabileceğinin incelenmesi amaçlanıyor. Bu sebeple, henüz 
Türkçe karşılıkları olmadığından İngilizce karşılıklarını verebildiğim, Jacques 
Derrida’nm ‘ logocentricm’, ‘differance’, ‘ iterability’ , ve ‘arche-writing’ olarak 
isimlendirmiş olduğu kavramların ilgili metimlerde izleri sürülerek yapıbozumunda 
‘çerçeveleme’ üzerine bir kuamsal sonuç elde ediliyor.
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INTRODUCTION
[...] the task is .. to dismantle [déconstruire] the 
metaphysical and rhetorical structures at work in 
[the text], not in order to reject or discard 
them, but to reinscribe them in an other way'(MP 
256, WM 13)" [Spivak, 1976:lxxv]).
... A reading that produces rather than protects 
[Spivak, 1976: Ixxv].
This study has far and immediate purposes. As for the 
far purpose, it draws from an interest on research in what 
today is referred to as 'graphic novels' . Though this topic 
is not taken up here in this thesis, it is hoped that the 
theoretical ground which will be set and discussed in this 
study would serve the base for such an analysis, or yet 
other analyses. In this thesis, however, titled "A 
Theoretical Discussion on Framing" the immediate purpose 
operates which is to discuss how that which Derrida refers to 
as 'Deconstruction' operates on what it deconstruct, may it
be texts, discourses or institutions, as well as to find out
how and at what place the frame, in the sense of borders, 
delimitations, separation in general and of the work of art 
in particular can be given within this operation. Hence, 
certain threads which Jacques Derrida picks up in relation to 
Martin Heidegger's work titled "The Origin of the Work of 
Art" [1971] and weaves his The Truth in Painting [1987] with, 
will be followed.
Within this scope, in Part 1 the task is to produce an 
expository study on deconstruction in general. Any of 
Derrida's texts always grafts yet others into themselves which 
makes the reader feel a bottomless and inexhaustable abyss 
opening in front of him/her. Each term, concept or assertion 
brings with it a seies of others into the picture. A vast 
intertexuality opens up in front of the reader and makes it 
hard to decide where to begin. Whichever thread one chooses 
to pick up from Derrida's textile reveals connections with 
others, not in linear fashion, but multi-directionally.
Hence, the more one tries to limit the scope, the wider it 
gets. This Part, as well as this thesis in its totality, 
happens to be the end-result of this struggle. Consequently, 
for reasons of convenience, I made the initial decision to
start introductory remarks on deconstruction [1.1] followed
with the deconstruction of the Saussurean sign [Part 1.2]. 
Proceeding this one possible thread among many others, guided 
my reading via the deconstruction of Plato's Socraic 
dialogue titled "Phaedrus" [1.4] upto the deconstruction of 
Husserlian Phenemonology [1.5]. As Derrida states there is no 
end, not an absolute one to such paths taken. Hence, like 
he, himself, does at the beginning to his "Lemmata" in The 
Truth in Painting, I followed it until I said to myself "that 
is enough", making a retour back to the place where I started 
in the same order, yet realizing that it was not exactly the 
same path I came from anymore. Or, it was the same path but 
not identical to itself, for on both ways deconstruction was 
at work, hence at each step difference was inscribed. Where 
I began with Saussure's concept of 'sign', I ended up with 
Derrida's 'arche-writing' [1.6].
Part 2, titled "Interface" serves the purpose of 
providing a pasage between Part 1 and Part 3. I have chosen 
to title it as such to indicate that the first part does not 
really precede the third but is the result of the questions 
which had arisen from the latter. In this part, I have also 
placed the focal point of this thesis, ie. framing.
In the final part, ie. Part 3 titled "On Derrida's 
Discussion of Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art"", I 
have attempted to find out how the deconstruction of 
Heidegger's and by way of it Hegel's discourses on art 
reveals the question on framing. To serve this purpose in 
Part 3.1 "Introductory Remarks: On Heidegger's Conceptions of 
'Being' and 'Time' will be taken up. Part 3.2 is devoted to 
"Introducing the Problem: Heidegger's Point of Departure In 
His "The Origin of the Work of Art""; Part 3.3 to "The Form 
of the Question 'What is the Origin of the Work of Art" and 
Part 3.4 to "The Figure of the Circle". Some concluding 
remarks are given in the "Conclusion".
Since the nature of this text allows for and
necessitates details to be presented in the main body, having 
annotated itelf already, I preferred a glossary, rather than 
endnotes not to complicate the organization further. The 
items included in the 'Glossary' are marked by an asterisk in
the text.
Finally "References" will be presented in the end. In 
the References only those sources parts from which are quoted
in the thesis or those direct reflection of which are
inevitable are listed. English translations of the texts in 
other languages, ie. French and German, will be used. As 
such reference is made to the year and place of publication 
of the translated versions. Names of translators are also
supplied in the 'References' .
1 ON DECONSTRUCTION
1.1 Introductory Remarks
In this Part I will try to make a few points on how 
deconstruction works, i.e. on its methodology, if one may use 
this word in relation to Derrida's ouvre. For Derrida 
himself, as Christopher Norris explains in his 
Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, "maintains an extreme 
and examplary scepticism when it comes to defining his own
methodology" (Norris, 1993:31).
For this purpose I will start with the deconstruction 
of Saussurean linguistics and, in particular, Saussure's 
concept of 'sign', which was inherited later by the 
structuralists. Being a literature graduate, and a masters 
student at Graphic Design department, Derrida's writings on 
the 'sign' form my first encounter with deconstruction. Also, 
the deconstruction of the sign is examplary, as Richard
Beardsworth states in his Derrida and the Political, because.
metaphysics -the structures of which Derrida sets to undo- 
”is derived from a domination of a particular relation 
between the ideal and the material which assumes definition 
in the concept of 'sign'" [Beardsworth, 1996:7]. Hence, an 
elaboration of the deconstruction of the 'sign' seemed to be 
an appropriate beginning for a description of how 
deconstruction moves. Moreover, since the binary opposition 
of the ideal and the material is first introduced by Plato, a 
brief summary of Derrida's work related to Platonism will 
also be included here[cf. ibid.:15].
1.2 The Deconstruction of the Sign
In his "Translator's Introduction" to Writing and 
Difference by Jacques Derrida, Alan Bass, gives a brief 
account of what deconstruction does, or how it works as
follows:
...Every totality, [Derrida] shows, can be totally 
shaken, that is, can be shown to be founded on 
that which it excludes, that which would be in 
excess for a reductive analysis of any kind [...] 
This excess is often posed as an 'aporia'*, the 
Greek word for a seemingly insoluble logical 
difficulty: once a system has been "shaken" by 
following its totalizing logic to its final 
consequences, one finds an excess which can not be 
construed within the rules of logic, for the 
excess can only be conceived as neither this nor
that, or both at the same time- a departure from 
all rules of logic. [Bass, 1995; xvi-xvii]
Bass further explains that because philosophy is founded on 
'archia'*, regulation by true principles, which are excluded 
by discourses, yet govern them from outside, the 
deconstruction of a philosophical discourse reveals this 
differential excess which makes the founding principles as
such possible.
Likewise, Christopher Norris, in his The Deconstructive 
Turn, explains that decontruction begins by questioning the 
deep laid assumption, the root metaphysical prejudice that 
philosophy has to do with certain kinds of truth, self­
identical concepts, which are outside and above the 
disseminating play of language [cf. Norris, 1983:1-6]. 
Derrida refers to this root metaphysical prejudice as
'logocentrism'*.
When he turns to Saussurean lingustics in his Of 
Grammatology [1976], Derrida finds a similar aporia as 
defined above. Though Saussure's attempt to found a science 
of linguistics, at the center of which he places his concept
of the sign, may be viewed as a denial of the Western
logocentric separation of language and thought, where 
language is given a secondary position, his project still 
coiranits logocentrism in the form of phonocentrism* this time, 
by privileging speech over writing. In Saussure's 
linguistics, language is seen as a system of 'signs' that 
express ideas; a network of elements that signify only in 
relation to each other. The sign is constituted of two parts; 
the 'signifier' and the 'signified'. Though these are said to 
be inseparable, like the two sides of a sheet of paper, the 
distinction between the two is still retained. The 
'signifier' (mental sound-image)refers to a meaningful form 
while the 'signified' (meaning, mental conception) refers to 
the concept that that form evokes. No natural bond links a 
given signifier to its signified; the nature of linguistic 
sign is totally arbitrary, unmotivated, and it derives 
entirely from convention within a certain linguistic system. 
Neither the signifier nor the signified holds any prior or 
autonomous existence. That is why, within such a definition, 
it does not, at first glance, seem plausible to see this 
distinction as a binary dualist opposition, where one side of 
the opposition is given priority over the other.
Consequently, according to Saussure "in language there are
only differences without positive terms" and meaning emerges
through the play of those differences. Another claim Saussure 
makes is that language does not have any ideas or sounds that 
existed before the linguistic system itself. This implies 
that Saussure does not conceive of anything beyond language, 
ie. a trancendental signified, for the generation of meaning. 
However, Derrida points out the fact that for the difference 
between the signifier and the signified to be irreducible and 
absolute, there has to be a trancendental signified which is 
incapable of referring to any other term beyond itself within 
the realm of signification. Were there not any such 
trancendental signified, on the other hand, there would be an 
endless play of signification where each signified functioned 
as a signifier in turn, deferring meaning endlessly. However, 
Saussure, as we know, holds on to the distinction between 
'signifier' and 'signified'. Hence, contradictory to his 
denial of anything beyond language, in Saussure's project of 
liguistics, there seems to be a transcendental signified that 
constitutes itself at least in part on what it represses [cf. 
Silverman, 1983:4-14,32,43 and Norris, 1993:24-32].
At this point, Derrida refers the reader to another 
distinction Saussure makes, one between 'langue' (language)- 
which denotes the "abstract system of distinct signs
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corresponding to distinct ideas, true of all languages"- and
'parole' (speech)- "the empirical multiplicity of languages
with their linguistic, physical and physiological variations"
[Beardsworth, 1996:8]. Saussure defines parole (speech) as
the manifestation or realisation of the sound-image, that is
to say of the signifier in the realm of language which is the
form that evokes the signified, ie. the concept. This makes
of the word uttered the signifier -of the signifier.
Furthermore, when it comes to writing, the graphic sign,
Saussure defines it merely as the phonetic representation of
speech, which comes down to defining it as the signifier of
the signifier of the signifier. Within this chain of
signifiers, he assigns a natural unity to the one between the
sound-image (signifier) and the mental conception, concept,
meaning (signified), ie, the sign itself, and adds that the
phonetic pronunciation of a word is distinct from the sound-
image whose manifestation it happens to be.
It is impossible for the sound in itself, the 
material element, to belong to langue. It is only 
a secondary thing, substance to be put to use .. 
the linguistic signifier .. is not phonic but 
incorporeal -constituted not by its material 
substance but by the differences which separate 
its sound-image from all others. (Saussure, 
1915:164-5/118-19) [Beardsworth, 1996:14].
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Yet, Saussure finds a more natural relation between the 
physiological manifestation of the sound-image, the word 
uttered and heard, and the sound-image itself, than that 
between this physiological manifestation and its graphic, 
visual representation. He does not even consider the 
possibility of a direct relation between the sound-image and 
the graphic representation ie. writing. That is why Saussure 
declares that "the linguistic object is not defined by the 
combination of the written and the spoken word: the spoken 
form alone constitutes the object" [Derrida, 1976:31].
According to Saussure, writing is not only the phonetic 
representation of speech, it also is "a perversion of the 
natural order of language, an influence that operates always 
from outside to corrupt or destroy the pure spontaneity of 
self-present speech" [Norris, 1987:89]. Being a tyrant, as 
Saussure considers it to be, "writing usurps the natural 
phonetic pronunciations of words, substituting for them their 
visual images" [Beardsworth, 1996:9]. The example Derrida 
recounts from Saussure is of the proper name 'Lefèvre', which 
has come to be pronounced 'Lefébure' because it was written
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'Lefebvre' [cf. Derrida, 1976:41]. Consequently, Saussure 
concludes that:
[...] Such phonic deformations belong to language but 
do not stem from its natural functioning. They are 
due to an external influence. Linguistics should 
put them into a special compartment for 
observation: they are teratological cases. [...] 
[Ibid.: 42].
Though Saussure debases writing as such, defines it as a
monstrosity and expels it from his new science, he also
states, at the beginning of the Course in General
Linguistics, that "the only access to the matter of
linguistics is through writing" [Beardsworth, 1996:9].
Derrida quotes from Saussure the following passage where he
takes writing as an analogy to clarify what he means when he
says 'in language there are only differences without positive
terms' and 'the sign is arbitrary':
Since an identical state of affairs is observable in 
writing, another system of signs, we shall use 
writing to draw some comparisons that will clarify 
the whole issue. In fact:
1) The signs used in writing are arbitrary; there is no 
connection, for example, between the letter t and the 
sound that it designates.
2) The value of letters is purely negative and 
differential. The same person can write t, for 
instance, in different ways:
t  t t
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The only requirement is that the sign for t is not 
confused in the script with the signs used for I, 
d, etc.
3) Values in writing function only through the 
reciprocal opposition within a fixed system that 
consists of a set number of letters. This third 
characteristic, though not identical to the second, 
is closely related to it, for both depend on the 
first. Since the graphic sign is arbitrary, its form 
matters little or rather matters only within the 
limitations imposed by the system.
4) The means by which the sign is produced is completely 
unimportant, for it does not affect the system (this 
also follows from characteristic 1). Whether I make 
the letters in white or black, raised or engraved, 
with pen or chisel - all this is of no importance 
with respect to their signification, (pp.165-166)
[Pp.119-120] [Derrida, 1976: 326-327].
As we witness in the above quoted passage, each time 
Saussure has recourse to examples from writing, he 
contradicts his on assertion that the spoken word alone 
constitutes the object of linguistics. Not only does he 
contradict this assertion of his, but he also contradicts the 
hierarchical order he constitutes between speech and writing. 
If, as Saussure asserts in the above quotation, 'an identical 
state of affairs is observable in writing' and in speech, if 
the same laws bind both all the same then, how come can one 
of these be subordinated to the other? If an analogy to 
writing serves the purpose of explaining how language works
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rather than another analogy, does it not follow that writing 
should be given priority instead? If the sign is arbitrary or 
unmotivated, does not this notion of arbitrariness make an 
institution of the sign? Make of it something institutional, 
rather than natural? Then, how is Saussure's claim on the 
natural unity of the signifier (sound-image) and the 
signified (mental-conception) to be justified? More 
importantly, if he finds a more natural unity between the 
signifier and the signified in speech, rather than in 
writing, should not the written sign be the object of 
linguistics since the notions of the arbitrary nature of 
sign, and free play of signification are, as he claims, to be 
found in the realm of writing? These questions arise 
inevitably from the contradictions Saussure's discourse on 
language engenders. Or rather, they arise from the blindness 
to the aporetic in his discourse. Hence, his project of 
linguistics deconstructs itself already. It is the 
centrality Saussure assigns to the phone, in other words, to 
the notion of self-presence that limits the play of 
significance envisaged by him. Hence it would not be wrong 
to conclude, I believe, that the notion of self-presence 
appears in Saussure's discourse as a fixed origin, and as a 
transcendental signified. The gap, which opens in Saussure's
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discourse as a result of the aporia inherent in it, allows 
Derrida to propose to make a verbal substitution in the 
passage where Saussure anticipates a new science, ie. 
'semiology'. Wherever Saussure uses this word Derrida 
substitutes it with Grammatology*. Hence the passage reads 
as follows:
I shall call it [Grammatology]... Since the science 
does not exist, no one can say what it would be; 
but it has a right to existence, a place staked 
out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of 
[that] general science...; the laws discovered by 
[grammatology] will be applicable to linguistics 
(p.33) [p.l6]. [Derrida, 1976:51].
This above substitution may seem to work simply for a 
reversal of Saussure's speech-writing hierarchy. If this 
were the case, the question whether giving priority to 
writing instead of speech would not be an equally logocentric 
approach would be justified. However, as Norris reminds his
reader.
Deconstruction is not simply a strategic reversal 
of categories which otherwise remain distinct and 
unaffected. It seeks to undo both a given order 
of priorities and the very system of conceptual 
opposition that makes that order possible... 
[Norris, 1993:31].
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In Positions, Henri Rose asks a similar question: "Can there 
be a surpassing of metaphysics? Can a graphocentricism be 
opposed to a logocentricism?" Derrida replies that this sort 
of opposition of one center to another center has never been 
a question for him, not in Of Grammatology, nor anywhere
else:
It is not a question of returning writing its 
rights, its superiority or its destiny .. Of 
Grammatology is the title of a question: a 
question about the necessity of a science of 
writing, about the conditions that would make it 
possible, about the critical work that would have 
to open its field and resolve the epistemological 
obstacles; but it is also a question about the 
limits of this science [Derrida, 1987a; 12-13].
But what Derrida uses the word 'writing' for should perhaps
be clarified here.
1.3 Derrida's Notion of General Writing
Derrida proposes to understand 'writing' in its most 
general sense, in the sense of inscription, which is not 
limited to graphic inscription only. First of all he states 
that Saussure's conception of writing is very limited in its
scope:
In effect Saussure limits the number of 
systems of writing to two, both defined as systems
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of representation of oral language, either 
representing words in a synthetic and global manner 
[the ideographic system], or representing 
phonetically the elements of sounds constituting 
words [the phonetic system that is syllabic or 
alphabetic] [Derrida, 1976:32].
The limitation, according to Derrida, is justified by 
Sausure's notion of the arbitrariness of the sign, following 
which Saussure discards the concepts such as, 'symbolic' 
writing, or figurative writing. When graphism entails a 
natural relation of resemblance, then Saussure views it as 
representation, or drawing. That is why the concept of 
pictographic or natural writing would be contradictory 
according to Saussure. Derrida points to yet another 
'massive limitation' that Saussure introduces, namely his 
decision to limit his discussion "to the phonetic system and 
especially to the one used today, the system that stems from 
the Greek alphabet" [ibid.: 33]. Thus, Derrida opposes the 
non-phonetic varieties, such as hieroglyphs, algebraic 
notions, and formalised languages of different kinds to this 
limited notion of writing [cf. Norris, 1993:29].
In fact, Derrida arrives at this thesis of a generalised 
writing by way of following a certain aspect of Saussure's 
discourse on language, ie, his analogy with writing and the
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immateriality of the sound-image [cf. Beardsworth, 1996:17]. 
First, as explained earlier, the sound-image is distinguished 
from its phonetic materialisation (word uttered and heard) by 
Saussure, and writing is said to be just the phonetic 
representation of that materialisation, hence, thrice removed 
from the sound image. Yet, though he asserts that the spoken 
word alone constitutes the object of linguistics, to explain 
the arbitrariness, the unmotivatedness of the sign, and the 
differential nature of value in language, he cannot help 
having recourse to the analogy of writing, whereby, he proves 
that writing is as equally a system of signs by its own 
right, as the system of speech, to say the least. Moreover, 
the example of the name 'Lefevre' that Saussure gives -whose 
pronunciation changes because of the way it is written- in 
his attempt to expel writing as a teratological case from his 
science of language, accounts for the fact that writing is, 
in fact, capable of causing changes in the system of speech, 
let alone being dominated by it, or being a mere phonetic 
representation of it. It follows from these, that the 
graphic sign signifies directly the sound-image without a 
detour through speech. So, we can say that, at this point, 
by forcing the contradictions in Saussure's discourse toward
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their limit, the status of writing is raised to the level of 
being prior to speech; the hierarchical order is reversed.
Before continuing with the explication of how Derrida 
arrives at a concept of general writing, ie. arche-writing, I 
would like to pause for a while, and draw attention to the 
similarity of the sound-image - speech - writing hierarchy of 
Saussure's and Plato's thought- speech - writing hierarchy. 
The devaluation of writing, as Derrida demonstrates in 
several different texts of his, on different thinkers' 
discourses, does not appear in Saussure's discourse on 
language for the first time. On the contrary, this 
devaluation is one of the major threads, which can be 
followed all through the history of western metaphysics. 
Derrida's "Plato's Pharmacy" in his Dissemination is one such 
text where he engages with Plato's dialogue entitled Phaedrus 
and points at the similar devaluation of writing as opposed 
to the spoken [cf. Norris, 1987:28-29]. Since the history of 
philosophy marks its beginning with Platonic dialogues, it 
seems appropriate here to turn our attention to the 
deconstruction of Plato's Phaedrus, to emphasise how deeply 
rooted this metaphysical prejudice is in western thought, 
indeed. A short detour through "Plato's Pharmacy" will
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clarify the exemplarity of the deconstruction of 'sign' and 
assist the way to 'arche-writing', as well.
1.4 "Plato's Pharmacy": the Speech/Writing Opposition
To begin with, Plato envisaged a transcendental realm 
(the world of knowledge, the intelligible world; the ideal 
world) the shadow or image of which was the material realm 
(the physical world; the phenomenal world) [cf. Burns, 1963]. 
According to him, knowledge means absolute knowledge; the 
knowledge of the transcendental realm. Here it must be noted 
that Plato conceives the relation between these worlds as one 
of imitation. The material world imitates the transcendental 
world, which is populated with God's ideal creations.
Because the material world is a derivation of the 
transcendental one, it is defective; it can not yield 
absolute knowledge on its own for it is inconsistent, it 
changes all the time. Yet, through the analogy with a cave, 
where people are tied down facing the walls on which they see 
the shadows of the world outside, Plato explains that the 
knowledge of the transcendental realm can be reached through 
its shadow; the material world, only with the aid of correct 
reasoning. So, the ideal absolute examples of everything in 
the material realm, even of notions, exist in the
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transcendental realm. What we encounter in the material 
realm are just inadequate copies of them, which can never 
rise to the status of being identical replicas. For example, 
the ideal of 'bed' is produced by God. What the carpenter 
produces is an inferior imitation of the ideal one. And when 
a painter paints a 'bed' his production is a distorted 
imitation of the 'bed' produced by the carpenter which itself 
is the already distorted imitation of the ideal bed. Hence, 
the painter's production is seen to be thrice removed from 
the ideal, thrice distorted. That is why the latter is to be 
avoided in seeking the absolute truth and knowledge. As we 
see in the case of Platonic thinking, the dualist binary 
opposition of transcendental/material reveals the necessity 
and unavoidability of this hierarchical ordering at the 
expense of expelling art from his meditation. Being thrice 
removed from the domain of philosophy, writing is treated 
similarly within this hierarchical order. Yet this 
repression of writing cannot be prevented from being 
articulated at the same time; we receive Plato's Phaedrus in 
its written form.
Derrida's discussion of this dialogue moves around the 
Greek word 'pharmakon', which Socrates uses for referring to
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writing in his reply to Pheadrus who reads to him Lysias' 
speech about love. After a discussion on love, they move on 
to a discussion on writing where Socrates recounts the myth 
of Theuth, the inventor of writing (and in fact, not only 
writing, but, among other things, the arts of geometry, 
mathematics, astronomy, dice and draught, as well)[cf. 
Johnson, 1993:xxiv]. Theuth-the demi-god-, visits Thamus- the 
sun king, the father of the gods-, and presents to him his 
inventions as gifts:
"...Theuth came to [Thamus, the King of all 
Egypt...the god himself ] and exhibited his arts and 
declared that they ought to be imparted to the 
other Egyptians. And Thamus questioned him about 
the usefulness of each one; and as Theuth 
enumerated, the King blamed or praised what he 
thought were good or bad points in the 
explanation... but when it came to writing, Theuth 
said, 'This discipline..., my King will make the 
Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories...: 
my invention is a recipe (pharmakon) for both 
memory and wisdom'."[Derrida, 1993:75]
King Thamus declines the offer firmly; saying it is no good 
for mankind; that it is not a remedy but a poison:
" 'Theuth, my master of arts..., to one man it is 
given to create the elements of an art, to another 
to judge the extent of harm and usefulness it will 
have for those who are going to employ it.-And
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now, since you are father of written letters(pater 
on grammaton), your parental goodwill has led you 
to pronounce the very opposite... of what is their 
real power. The fact is that this invention will 
produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who 
have learnt it because they will not need to 
exercise their memories..., being able to rely on 
what is written, using the stimulus of external 
marks alien to themselves... rather than, from 
within, their own powers to call things to mind.... 
So it is not a remedy for memory, but for 
reminding, that you have discovered.... And as for 
wisdom(Sophias de) You are equipping your pupils 
with only a semblance(doxan) of it, not with 
truth(aletheian). Thanks to you and your 
invention, your pupils will be widely read without 
benefit of a teacher's instruction; in consequence 
they will entertain the delusion that they have 
wide knowledge, while they are, in fact for the 
most part incapable of real judgement. They will 
also be difficult to get on with since they will 
be men filled with the conceit of 
wisdom(doxosophoi), not men of wisdom(anti 
sophon)'". [Derrida, 1993:102]
Here, the King's reply contains two points which are of 
interest for Derrida; priority given to the self-presence of 
truth, and the repression of writing for the sake of this 
ideal of self-presence. The pattern for patriarchal 
inheritance for the handing down of philosophical truth- 
claims is established within the ideal that privileges the 
relationship between teacher and good receptive student.
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where the father retains full powers until the son comes of 
age and is also able to exercise reason on his own behalf. In 
this respect writing is seen as that dangerous supplement 
which substitutes lifeless, alien signs for the authentic 
living presence of spoken language. It is seen as that which 
breaks such ideal establishment of the reletionship between 
teacher and pupil dangerously [cf. Norris, 1987:30-31]. "For 
with the access to writing... men's real powers of memory will 
rapidly decline, since they will no longer need to remember 
anything at all-inwardly and actively get it by heart- when 
they can simply look things up on demand"[ibid.:30].
Apparently, Socrates agrees with King Thamus, whose 
reply he recites to Pheadrus, in all respects. However, as 
Dérida points out, he can not help taking recourse in 
métaphores of writing in denouncing it in defence of self­
present, spoken truth.
There is a perpetual double movement in Plato's 
text by which positive values (speech, self- 
presence, living memory) are defined only by 
contrast to whatever threatens or invades their 
privileged domain. So speech is represented, not 
only as the opposite of writing, but as a 'good' 
kind of writing that is inscribed in the soul by 
revealed or self-authorized truth. Living memory 
is that which avoids the bad detour through 
writing (mere marks on the page), but which is
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still very often defined by metaphors of 
engraving, deciphering, inscription, and other 
such textual figures [ibid.:36].
We need to remember here that for Socrates and Plato 
knowledge, truth was already placed in the soul innately. All 
one had to do to was to unveil them, bring them into light. 
Through correct reasoning these could be revealed to the 
person, that is to say could be remembered by the person. 
Consequently, he makes a distinction between good memory and 
bad memory or, as Derrida puts it, between knowledge as 
memory and non-knowledge as rememoration. Socrates names 
knowledge as memory 'anamnesis', ie. "an act of unforgetting, 
a recollection of spiritual truths which the soul has 
forgotten in its fallen state, its confinement to the prison- 
house of the senses, but which can still be summoned to mind 
through wise teaching and the disciplines of self- 
knowledge" [ibid. : 31] . The bad memory is that which 
substitutes mnemonic devices for genuine, living wisdom, i.e. 
writing. Writing is condemned because, being a mnemonic 
device, it is thought to block the way to truth. Here, as 
was the case with Saussure's speech/writing distinction, 
Derrida shows the reader very successfully that writing, 
inscription, is what makes speech and graphic writing
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possible equally. Inscription in general forms the 
possibility of attaining truth for truth is inscribed in the
soul in the first instance.
The word Plato uses to refer to writing in Phaedrus is 
the Greek word 'pharmakon' which means both poison and 
remedy. Having this double denotative power this word is 
actually well fitted for Plato's purposes since he conceives 
of writing in these two meanings, though in different 
situations, i.e. good writing, inscribed in the soul, and bad 
writing, the graphic mnemonic device. However, he makes it 
very clear that, in reference to the graphic-mnemonic device, 
he uses the word in its negative meaning.
Yet, he cannot limit the operation of the word in the 
text, for it retains the double meaning against Plato's 
contrary efforts. Derrida relates this effort of reducing 
the double meaning of the word 'pharmakon' to Plato's attempt 
to institute philosophy as a discipline against the Sophists. 
Those who wrote before Plato had approached writing "as a 
fixing of what should be mobile", and in this sense 
negatively, but they referred to the 'logos' as a
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'pharmakon', ie. as a drug; medicine or poison, as well
[Hobson, 1998: 63]. Derrida explains;
Despite these similarities, the condemnation of 
writing is not engaged in the same way by the 
rhetors as it is in the Phaedrus. If the written 
word is scorned, it is not as a pharmakon coming 
to corrupt memory and truth. It is because logos 
is a more effective pharmakon. This is what 
Georgias calls it. As a pharmakon, logos is at 
once good and bad; it is not at the outset 
governed by goodness or truth. It is only this 
ambivalence and this mysterious indétermination of 
logos, and after these have been recognized, that 
Gorgias determines truth as a world, a structure 
or order, the counterpart (kosmos) of logos. In so 
doing he no doubt prefigures the Platonic gesture. 
[Derrida, 1993:115].
As the above quotation points to, the condemnation of writing 
is much older than Platonism, but it is with Plato that it is 
opposed to speech, following the institution of the 
transcendental and material opposition [cf. Beardsworth,
1996: 15]. This institution is held to be the introduction 
of the western metaphysics as we know it today. 'Pharmakon' 
retains its double meaning against Plato's contrary efforts 
and being as such "opens the possibility of the decision and 
the separation of components", of the terms of the binary 
oppositions as ordered hierarchically [Hobson, 1998:64]. That 
is to say, the implanation of these logocentric binary
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oppositions, from which the repression of writing in defense
of speech follows, is a result of Plato's decision to
institute philosophy against the Sophists. And the violence
of this decision comes to the foreground in those passages
where he cannot help having recourse to the metaphors and
anologies of writing for explaining and supporting his
assertion of innate knowledge which happens to be the main
passage to absolute truth; the possibility of our having
access to it. A violence similar to Saussure's. Being that
which opens the possibility of decision and separation,
'Pharmakon', Derrida asserts, does not have an essence or
eidos*; a "prior medium" but "not a mixed medium", "in which
differentiation is produced" [ibid]. In this sense it is
neither intelligible nor sensible, neither active nor
passive, etc. For the decision to be possible, Derrida
concludes, this medium connot be homogeneous. Consequently,
'pharmakon' is that which is same but not identical:
[...] [ 'Pharmakon' ] refers back to a same that is not
identical, to the common element of medium of any 
possible dissociation... If the 'pharmakon' is 
'ambivalent', it is because it constitutes the 
medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement 
and the play that links them among themselves, 
reverses them or makes one side cross over into the 
other (soul/body, good/evil, inside/outside, 
memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing,etc.). It is 
on the basis of this play or movement that the
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opposites or differences are stopped by Plato. The 
'pharmakon' is the movement, the locus, and the 
play: the production of difference. It is the 
difference or the difference. It holds in reserve, 
in its undecided shadow and vigil, the opposites 
and the différends that the process of 
discrimination will come to carve out. 
Contradictions and pairs of opposites are lifted 
from the bottom of this diacritical differing, 
deferring, reserve. Already inhabited by 
difference, this reserve, even though it "precedes" 
the opposition between different effects, even 
though it preexists differences as effects, does 
not have the punctual simplicity of a 'coincidentia 
oppositorum' [coincidence of opposites]... The 
'pharmakon' without being anything in itself, 
always exceeds them in constituting their 
bottomless fund .. It keeps itself forever in 
reserve even though it has no fundamental 
profundity nor ultimate locality .. [ibid.: 127-8].
To arrive at a clearer understanding of 'pharmakon's being 
the same without being identical, a brief recourse to 
Husserl's phenomenology and Derrida's work on Husserl is 
needed.
1.5 Iterability and Differance
Beardsworth explains that in Husserl's "Origin of 
Geometry", the possibility of the phenomenological reduction 
of the world is derived from writing, together with the 
accompanying possibility to have access to transcendental
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ideality. Husserlian phenomenology puts this difference as 
the difference between ideal objects which are "attained 
through what Husserl calls the phenomenological reduction (or 
'epokhe'*) of factuality (the world with all its variations 
and contingencies)" and "the world in its difference and 
empiricity" [1996:16]. Within this difference, "writing 
constitutes ideal objects by delivering them from their ties 
of spatio-temporal facticity" [ibid.]. Repetition through 
time and space forms the condition of ideality of these ideal 
objects and this repetition depends on the inscription of 
these on a material support which, nevertheless, allows them 
to be transcended from the material world. Because the 
support itself is material, it necessarily restricts the 
purity of the trancendence aimed at. Moreover, "such 
repetition is not possible unless the difference of each 
inscription re-marks the inscription. Yet, Husserl also 
claims that "the return to origins is always possible" 
[Descombes, 1980:143]. Monuments or ruins whose origins, 
what they were used for, what they meant to those who built 
them, are lost may be taken as an example to clarify the 
possibility of this return to origins. Even though "the 
meaning that the (for ourselves) meaningless trace" of these 
monuments; ie. their ruins, has for us cannot be made to
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know a priori that this point, when it was present, had all
the properties of the present" ie. the meaning of the present
is retained through time. [ibid.]. Hence , this other is in
fact the same, which comes down to conceiving history as the
Pure history of meaning, .. a tradition or 
translation of meaning across time .. [as a] 
univocal [infinite toality] even if the integral 
recollection of meaning is impossible. The identity 
of being (implying here the 'having - been) and 
meaning is never given here and now, but 'at 
infinity'." [ibid.: 144].
coincide with "the meaning that it had for" those people, "we
Derrida deconstructs Husserl's phenomenology by way of
following this above internal contradiciton to its end. In
the phenomenology of Husserl's, Derrida explains.
The Living Present (...) is the universal and 
absolute form of transcendental experience to which 
Husserl refers us .. the descriptions of movements 
of temporalization .. seems to indicate to us how 
much transcendental phenomenology belongs to 
metaphysics [Derrida, 1976: 62].
As the above quotation indicates, "the present is always 
delayed with regard to itself" and, that is why, it cannot 
attain pure transcendence as its telos. On the contrary, 
says Derrida, "there is an 'originary difference' between .. 
being and meaning" i.e. 'differance'. The present is always
32
defered and it always differs from itself. In short, turning 
Husserl's argument inside out Derrida asserts that "[tjhere 
is history because, from the origin onwards, the present is, 
so to speak, always delayed with regard to itself [Descombes, 
1980:145]. History is produced by 'difference', among other 
things.
This 'originary delay', 'originary difference', 
'difference' as Derrida names it, is, rather, a non-origin 
that is originary. Non-origin, because, it is not self­
identical. Consequently, it lacks form or essence, it lacks 
eidos, self-identical truth. If from the origin onwards, at 
the beginning and after, from the first time onwards there 
was no 'difference', the first time would not be the first 
time. "If there had only been simple identity at the origin, 
nothing would have come of it" [ibid. 146]. Because the 
first time needs the second time, which has to be at least 
slightly different than the first to be called the second, to 
be the first time. Then it is the second that opens the 
possibility of the first, without the second's assistance the 
first cannot be the first. Consequently, the second has some 
sort of a priority over the first. At the moment, the first 
time appears as the first time, the second must already be
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there as the first's prerequisite, and as the prerequisite of
its priority, as well. This allows us to say that the first
time is actually the third. The same logic binds the second
as well. Hence, there is repetition at the beginning. Very
much like a dress rehersal of a theatrical play which
reproduces the first public performance prior to it [cf.
ibid.]. Difference seems to be the possibility of repetition
which itself is not possible without this repetition, this
non-origin that is originary. Another name for it, which
Derrida uses in Limited Inc, is 'iterability' [cf.Hobson,
1998: 100]. This repetition makes of the original a copy in
the sense that it must always already be a copy in the sense
of the theatrical performance. The same logic binds the
relationship between presentation and representation as well;
without representation, presentation cannot be posited, it is
always already representation. Likewise, "there is not even
representation, since the presentation (of which this
representation is a reminder) never took place [Descombes,
1980: 146]. After stating that "transcendental phenomenology
belongs to metaphysics", he says.
In the originary temporalization and the movement 
of relationship with the outside, as Husserl 
actually describes them, non-presentation or 
depresentation is as "originary" as presentation 
[Derrida, 1976: 62].
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Derrida, as explained above, deconstructs Husserl's 
phenomenology but also extracts 'differance' from it, 
following its contradictions, selecting what is repressed in 
it as a result of a choice that is violent, and following it 
to its logical consequences. Spivak explains in her 
introduction of Of Grammatology that possibly, all texts keep 
the seeds of their own deconstruction within themselves, that 
they are at least double in this sense. Husserls's, she says 
contains this doubleness in an extraordinary transparency.
In the two short quotations from Derrida's Speech and 
Phenomena that she reproduces, Derrida suggests that in 
Husserl's Origin of Geometry there is an underlying motif 
which disturbs the traditional distinctions his text posits 
from within. And that ''[a]lthough (Husserl] had not made a 
theme of ... the work of difference in the constitution of 
sense and signs, he at the bottom recognized its necessity"
(... SP 101) [Spivak, 1976: liv] . Hence, 'differance', which 
Derrida claims is neither active, nor passive, or both at the 
same time; it is the same but not identical.
1.6 Arche*-Writing
In this final section of the first part, I will attempt 
to close the brackets I have opened so far in reverse order
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with the purpose of arriving at Derrida's notion of 'arche-
writing'.
Following Plato's debasing of writing, we had arrived at 
the assertion that 'pharmakon' is that which is same but not 
identical. Being so, it allows for or makes possible 
distinctions and decisions between the opposites; it is that 
which permits play much like 'difference' does. In Plato and 
since Plato, it has become the excluded middle resulting in 
mutually exclusive binary oppositions. In this sense it has 
also become a 'pharmakos' i.e. a scapegoat (like Socrates 
himself who was condemned to exile by Athenians because he 
was thought to corrupt the youth with false ideas such as 
monotheism. Hence, he was thought to be a poisoner magician; 
a'pharmakeus'. He poisoned himself rather than accepting the 
sentence which he believed would not be honorable to accept). 
In Plato's dialogue, writing was related to the two forms of 
memory; good memory and bad memory. Consequently, there were 
two kinds of writing: good writing, inscribed in the soul 
which stood for eidos (model form) and bad writing, graphic 
representation of living speech. Yet, their common root seems 
to be repetition. The medicine quality is attributed to 
"what is repeated in memory ..., that which is intelligible.
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stabilizable and self-present [Hobson, 1998: 66]. The poison 
quality, on the other hand, is attributed to the Sophist's 
techniques including writing (graphic representation and 
speech) by means of which what is repeated can be absent. In 
the good memory, good writing, this repetition is seen as the 
eidos of an ideal content, hence serves the purpose of giving 
access to it, whereas, in bad memory,bad writing this 
repetition is seen only as replication, imitation, 
representation. We had said that writing was condemned, by 
King Thamus and Socrates alike, because it was considered a 
harmful prosthesis to memory, because it was deceitful; 
pretending to aid memory, it would in fact divorce it of its 
power of remembering, acting parasitically on it it would 
kill memory. It is in this sense that according to Derrida 
writing is condemned as an evil supplement by Plato. Derrida 
explains that what is called the supplement is thought of as 
a surplus, as an addition to an integral whole too quickly.
If there were an integral whole, the supplement would be 
impossible. If there is supplement rather than nothing, this 
shows that what is conceived of as an integral whole is not 
self-contained, already defective, lacking something within 
itself. In similar fashion to the statement in the previous 
section that if there were simple, self-present identity at
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the origin, nothing would follow it, hence it would be 
impossible to pose it as an origin; Derrida uses the logic of 
the 'supplement', as explained above, to deconstruct Plato's 
Pheadrus and the privilege it assigns to self present speech 
over that so called dangerous supplement, i.e. writing, or 
rather, this logic of the supplement, inherent in Plato's 
discourse though it is repressed by it at the same time, is 
the point where Plato's text already deconstructs itself. If 
writing comes in to supplement speech, to supplement and to 
substitute it in the absence of it, then it follows that what 
is posited as self-present speech is defective in itself, it 
does not have that self identity and unity that is attributed 
to it in comparison to writing. The same logic actually 
binds what Plato refers to as good writing, the inscription 
in the soul of ultimate, self-identical truths, through which 
one has accès to these. In this sense, too, writing comes in 
to supplement self-present truth and to substitute it in its 
absence. Alingning the argument with the one on 'the first' 
and 'the second' presented in the previous section, it can be 
said that what is posed as self-present can only be 
distinguished from the absent on the condition that it 
already alludes to the absent. Hence Derrida's 'logic of the 
supplement'
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would have it that the outside be inside, that the 
other and the lack come to add themselves as a plus 
that replaces a minus, that what adds itself to 
something takes the place of a default in the 
thing, that the default, as the outside of inside, 
should already be the inside, etc, [Descombes,
1980: 148 quotes from Of Grammatoloqy].
Consequently, the hierarchy of eidos and writing is reversed; 
writing, i.e. pharmakon makes possible both eidos and writing 
in the ususal sense but cannot be subsumed by the oppositions 
it makes possible. Hobson illustrates this opposition as 
follows [1998:68]:
writing
,/  \eidos writing/ \eidos writing
[cf. Hobson, 1998:66-72; Descombes, 1980:149-150]
Having closed the bracket on 'Plato's Pharmacy' as 
above, I will now return to Derrida's notion of 'general 
writing' and in relation to it continue to follow the 
deconstruction of Saussure's discourse of language. Derrida 
finds a similar separation into binary oppositions, as 
emphasized earlier, in Saussure's project of linguistics.
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That Saussure's privileging of the phone already points to 
phonocentricism though he claims the signifier and the 
signified to be inseparable and not derived from anything 
beyond languge, has been stated earlier. And from this 
phonocentricism followed the sound-image, speech, writing 
hierarchy which was likened to Plato's thought, speech, 
writing hierarchy. Yet, what seems to be interesting and 
important in Saussure's case, like it was with Husserl's is 
that Saussure's discourse, too, contains the doubleness in an 
extra-ordinary transparency. It seems to be explicit even in 
Saussure's naming of the sound image as such. Even though 
the sound image attains a transcendental position by being 
tied to the phone essentially, in the naming of it, there is 
an indication of a reverse operation at work, a refusal to 
pass through the transcendental. Plato's hierarchy was rigid 
and unidirectional; a one way procession from thought to 
speech, then from speech to writing was envisaged. Likewise, 
in the chain of imitation. When seen from the Platonic 
perspective, the sound-image appears to be transcendental for 
Saussure insists in separating it from its materialized form, 
ie. its phonic representation in speech. Yet, it does not 
really seem to be the Platonic transcendental because the 
term also indicates itself as being the image of sound, the
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image of its materialized representation at the same time, 
implying a two way operation. Hence, according to Derrida, 
it places us in a middle ground, in a sort of excluded middle 
"neither suspended in the transcendental nor rooted in the 
empirical" [Beardsworth, 1996:17]. And Saussure's bracketing 
of the materiality of the sound-image, and his having 
recourse to the analogy with writing at that moment confirms 
the thesis of generalized writing, ie. 'arche-writing' for 
Derrida. To arrive at his point Derrida radicalizes the 
Husserlian problematic of the condition of ideality which is 
mentioned earlier; repetition though time and space always 
differing and deferring itself; ie. ’difference'. If we 
follow Saussure's example of the letter 't', Derida explains 
that for the letter 't' to be recognized and to have an 
identity as 't' it must be repeated. Identity cannot posit 
itelf unless there is repetition , yet, because there cannot 
be repetition without difference, it also puts in crisis the 
identity it produces. As we said before, at the origin, 
there is repetition, hence, there is that which is the same 
but not identical. Each time the letter 't' is repeated the 
difference of inscription re-marks the inscription, the 
sound-image, which in turn re-marks each materialization. It 
follows from this originary structure of repetition, which is
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a non-origin, that the 'sound-image' is rather the difference
of each of its materializations which can be phonic or
graphic. But the posibility of materialization cannot be
either. "The sound-image, Derrida says, is "not the sound
heard but the being-heard of sound" [Derrida, 1976: 163].
Hence, this being-imprinted of the imprint which is at work
in the relation between the sound-image and its
materialization is also 'differance' or 'trace';
Difference is therefore the formation of form.
But it is on the other hand, the being-imprinted of 
the imprint [ibid.].
Hence Derrida asks;
[...] is there a sense in establishing a "natural" 
hierarchy between the sound-imprint, for example 
and the visual (graphic) imprint? The graphic 
image is not seen; and the acoustic image is not 
heard. The difference between the full unities of 
the voice remains unheard. And the difference in 
the body of inscription is also invisible [ibid. 
65] .
Being the formation of the form, the being imprinted of the 
imprint, 'difference' is also an originary trace, an arche- 
trace. This originary-trace is not the dissappearance of an 
origin that was present at the first instance, it rather 
"means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was 
never constituted except reciprocally by a non-origin, the
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trace^ which thus becomes the origin of the origin", it 
becomes originary even though it itself is a non-origin 
[ibid.: 61]. It is this trace,the arche-trace as the 
Originary aporetic structure of repetition, that is called 
arche-writing by Derrida. Arche-writing is the possibility 
of inscription in general, because the trace ''belongs to the 
very movement of signification, [hence],signification is a 
priori written" [ibid.: 70] .
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2 INTERFACE
Above, I have tried to explain how deconstruction works 
through a series of bracketings, one inside the other, having 
recourse to one possible series of Derrida's terms among 
others, which I believe is important for a discussion on the 
frame, and on framing. However, the above placement of 
'differance' in the middle of the bracketings above and the 
emphasis put on it, should not mislead the reader to think 
that the others, ie., 'pharmakon', 'supplement',
'iterability', 'arche-trace' and 'arche-writing' are derived 
from it, that 'differance' is the genus of these other terms. 
Giving priority to one of these terms over the others, posing 
it as the origin of the rest, would be contradictory to the 
maneuvers of deconstruction and leave gaps through which 
these terms together with deconstruction itself could be 
deconstructed. In the texts referred to above, where some of 
these terms are weaved together at certain points, Derrida is 
always very careful not to raise one of these to the status
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of an origin, or a root, and the emphasis put on their being 
'non-origins' that are originary, already prevents such an 
accordance. In this respect, they may be said, perhaps, to 
be the same but not identical. Each time the originary non­
origin is arrived at through the deconstruction of 
discourses, or texts, or institutions, it is imprinted 
differently through this operation of terms, repeating the 
gesture they identify. Derrida states in reference to these 
series of terms that;
By definition the list has no taxonomical closure, 
and even less does it constitute a lexicon. First 
because these are not atoms, but rather focal 
points of economical condensation, sites of 
passage necessary for a very large number of marks 
... they spread out in a chain over the practical 
and theoretical entirety of a text, and each time 
in a different way [Derrida, 1987a:40].
Hence, these terms are related only to the texts from which 
they become active. That is why, when one encounters one or 
more of them grafted in another text, one is immediately 
referred back to these texts where they first appear. The 
procession of this part which took the form of brackets is 
actually due to the reference of such grafting. In Part 2 
below, some of these terms will be further weaved together 
with some others which arise from the relevant parts of
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Derrida's The Truth in Painting where his caution with the 
use of these terms becomes apparent to the extent that they 
nearly do not appear. Derrida himself explains that his 
texts can be grafted into his other texts, they can be taken 
as long essays which form another text, but he also warns 
that this cannot be done in a linear fashion [cf. ibid.:3-4]. 
His assertions of 'intertexuality', 'dissemination' and 
'grafting' already allows for long quotations and such 
connections to be made, in general. There are, even, moments 
in his texts where he refers the reader directly, to one of 
his other texts as a whole or to whole texts by some other. 
This justifies, I hope, to a certain extent, both the 
organization of this thesis and the connections I will 
attempt to make between some of the terms taken up in this 
part and some others which will come to the foreground in the 
next part.
Before passing on to Part 2, however, I would like to 
make a few concluding remarks and tie this part with the 
problem of the 'frame'. On the basis of the discussions 
presented above, would it perhaps be possible to view the 
assertion of logocentric binary oppositions in those texts 
which implicitly attempt to reverse them, such as Husserl's
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and Saussure's, as a result of their decision to leave aside 
or go beyond metaphysics at one step, without insisting on 
the logic of binary oppositions themselves ? Derrida seems to 
be giving an answer to this in his interview with Jean-Louis 
Houdebine;
[...] a "general economy", a kind of 'general 
strategy of deconstruction'... is to avoid both 
simply 'nutralizing' the binary oppositions of 
metaphysics and simply 'residing' within the 
closed field of these oppsistions, thereby 
confirming it.
Therefore we must proceed using a double gesture, 
acording to a unity that is both systematic and in 
and of itself divided, a double writing, that is, 
a writing that is in and of itself multiple, what 
I called in "La double seance", a double science 
[Derrida, 1987a: 41].
He further explains that a phase of 'overtuning' these binary 
oppositions is as necessary as marking "the interval between 
this inversion [...] and the irruptive emergence of a new 
"concept",a concept that can no longer be and never could be 
included in the previous regime" of dual oppositions 
[ibid.:42J. Yet, he adds that this phase does not 
necessarily come before what he calls the irruptive emergence 
of a new concept (such as those referred to in the previous 
paragraph). "It is not a question of chronological phase", 
he says, "[t]he necessity of this phase is structural" ie.
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"it is the necessity of an interminable analysis: the dual 
oppositions always reestablishes itself" [ibid.: 41-42]. 
Because what is being dealt with is never a 'peaceful 
coexistence' of the terms of these binary oppositions, but a 
violent hierarchy. Hence, neutralization of these binary 
oppositions, as we have seen in Saussure's attempt of 
neutralizing the signifier and the signified within the sign, 
without recognizing the necessity of overturning, leaves the 
previous field where these oppositions operated intact. That 
is why Saussure's discourse on language is caught up in 
phonocentricism, while trying to avoid positing any 
transcendental origin, while trying to work against the 
transcendental, material opposition, which brings into the 
field the opposition of speech and writing. On the other 
hand, according to Derrida, one should not stay in this 
phase, either, since, that, too, would be operating within 
the system being deconstructed and leaving the field 
untouched. Hence, the necessity of the double gesture, the 
double science quoted above. And "in order better to mark 
this interval" between the overturning and the irruptive 
emergence of a new concept, Derrida says it is necessary to 
set to work "certain marks .. that by 'analogy' I have called 
undecidables ... that can no longer be included within
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philosophical (binary) oppositions, but which, however 
inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganizing 
it, without ever constituting a third term" [ibid.:43]. That 
is why these marks can only be referred to with an operation 
of neither ... nor, or both .. and. For example as explained 
ealier, the 'pharmakon' is neither poison nor remedy, or both
at the same time.
The above 'neither .. nor' structure is referred to as 
'undecidables' because, as Beardsworth Explains, it opens up 
"an aporetic and uncontrollable position .. from which the 
future of thinking and practice is thought" [Beardsworth, 
1996:5]. Paying attention to the violence of these binary 
oppositions, fighting it with violence, yet, through the 
double gesture explained above, for the purpose of arriving 
at a lesser violence, here lies the political dimension to 
Derridean thinking, according to Beardsworth [cf. ibid.:19. 
The undecidable, the aporetic non-origin that is originary, 
is actually originary because it necessitates, it calls for 
decision and this brings in violence. Each time thinking 
decides on the aporia, the decision results in violently 
hierarchized binary oppositions, and this is inevitable. That 
is why it is called arche-violance. Decision, or rather the
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necessity of decision, which gives way to these binary 
oppositions, which separates and delimits the aporetic non­
origin into hierarchized opposites, opening an abyss between 
these terms is what I would like to call 'framing' here. It 
is this necessity which frames the aporetic non-origin into 
these binary opposites, at different degrees, and at 
different moments. Then, deconstruction, always holding to 
its limit, thinking this aporia aporetically may, perhaps, be 
seen as that which comes in to undo this frame and framing.
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3 ON DERRIDA'S DISCUSSION OF HEIDEGGER'S "THE ORIGIN OF THE
WORK OF ART"
3.1 Introductory Remarks: On Heidegger's Conceptions of 
'Being' and 'Time'
Following Part 1 "On Deconstruction", and Part 2 
"Interface", Derrida's tracing of Heidegger's discourse on 
art, as he puts it in his The Truth in Painting will form the 
main focus of this Part. For this purpose, however, first I 
would like to make a short introduction to Heidegger's 
philosophy via his conceptions of 'Being' and 'Time' and 
continue with a brief explication of his "The Origin of the 
Work of Art".
In Being and Time^(1927) , Heidegger basically dwells 
upon the question of the meaning of Being. All human beings, 
for Heidegger, disclose an inferred potential for a 
conceiving, comprehending interaction with bodies, with
‘ Some important concepts presented and questions posed in this part are taken from Mulhall 1996.
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presences as existing and as possessed of a unique nature. 
This potential of human beings manifests itself in the 
various forms of the verb to be as a linguistic expression.
In our lives there are modes of human activities in which 
attempt is made to comprehend and to make explicit what is 
taken for granted. One may do such on one's own and for one's 
own immediate needs. In disciplines, too, however, similar 
attempts are made which lead to theorizing. Knowledge 
obtained as the result of these theories is referred to as 
ontic knowledge by Heidegger. Nevertheless, in theorizing, 
too, there are things that are taken for granted related to 
the discipline itself. Because this is the case there happen 
to be states of crisis in the disciplines and different 
theories are constructed to take the discipline away from the 
state of crisis. Given this, Heidegger says that what 
theories reveal are ontological presuppositions of ontic 
enquiry.
Coming to philosophy, and to his initial enquiry on 
'Being', Heidegger asserts that philosophical tradition has 
put aside its basic question related to the Being. By saying 
this he does not mean that philosophers do not take up the
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question at all, but he rather says that they take it for 
granted that they know what the meaning of Being is.
Heideger does not take the enquiry on the meaning of
Being as unintentional, but as one that has the capacity to
start a theoretical investigation. It is a question that
reflects upon itself directly. In such a questioning a triple
articulation is in concern:
that which is asked about [...] is Being - that 
which determines entities as entities, that on the 
basis of which entities are always already 
understood. [Mulhall, 1996: 13]
Within the framework of this tripartite model for enquiry. 
Being is invariably the Being of an entity or entities and 
the enquiry is on the entities themselves, definitely in 
regard to their Being. The expected conclusion of the 
enquiry is the meaning of Being. The starting point of 
interrogation is, then, to start with the "right entity or 
entities to interrogate, to work out how best to approach 
them, and to allow the real unity-in-diversity of Being to 
emerge therby" [ibid.]. If one wants to follow this line
accurately.
[one] must clarify their nature and structure, 
make it clear to [oneself] what counts as doing 
them well and doing them badly. But choosing what
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to interrogate, working out how to interrogate it, 
relying upon a preliminary understanding of Being 
and attempting to clarify it : these are all modes 
of the Being of one particular kind of being, the 
kind for whom enquiring about entities with regard 
to their Being is one possibility of its Being - 
the entity which [one is oneself], the being 
Heidegger labels 'Dasein'*. [ibid., 14].
'Dasein', as such, is the object of inquiry, which takes 
place before the questions related to the meaning of Being 
are posed. However, Heidegger also claims that it is 
'Dasein' itself which is the most proper entity to be 
interrogated "in the posing of that question" [ibid.]. To 
put it in another way, enquiry related to 'Dasein' is not, 
for Heidegger, "an essential preliminary to" ontology, but it 
actually constitutes "the central core of fundamental 
ontology" [ibid.].
Heidegger makes a distinction between Being of Dasein 
and other entities that he calls what-beings. The term what- 
beings covers physical objects and animals because they are 
what they are. Whereas, for 'Dasein' "living just is taking 
a stand on who one is and on what is essential about one's 
being, and being defined by that stand". Heidegger very 
succintly puts the case as "Dasein's essence lies in
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existence", meaning that only if existing existence becomes a 
question that can be addresses. [Ibid.].
'Dasein', as an entity which constitutes "the central 
core of fundamental ontology" and the essence of which is 
existence exhibits an intimate relation as a Being to Being 
in three senses:
First, Dasein has an ontical priority: unlike any 
other entity, at every moment of its existence, it 
relates itself to its own Being, and does so in 
some particular way. Whatever its particular 
existentiell state, it has either chosen it, or 
got itself into it, or simply grown up 
unquestioningly into it. In Heidegger's terms 
'Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards 
that Being -a relationship which itself is one of 
Being' (BT, 4:32). Second, this ontic priority 
issues in an ontological priority: not only does 
Dasein always stand in some relation to its own 
Being, it also has a certain implicit 
understanding of that relation. For, [...] Dasein's 
relations with all entities in their Being are 
comprehending ones, so its relation with its own 
Being will be similarly comprehending. In other 
words an understanding of its own Being is itself 
a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being; every 
one of its existentiell modes contains an 
interpretation -however vague or implicit -of its 
own Being and so of (an aspect or mode of) Being 
itself. As Heidegger puts it, 'Dasein is 
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological' 
(BT, 4:32); it lives, moves and has its Being 
within an understanding of its Being. But of
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course, Dasein's relationship to Being is not 
restricted to its relationship to its own Being. 
Scientific investigations of the world, as well as 
our everyday activities within it, are grounded in 
our capacity to grasp any and all entities as 
entities (our capacity for ontological 
understanding). 'Dasein has therefore a third 
priority as providing the ontico-ontological 
condition for the possibility of any ontologies' 
(BT, 4:34) [ibid., 17].
The three priorities of 'Dasein', as quoted above, show 
us that through such 'Dasein' becomes a part of fundamental 
ontology. In this setting one comes across Being as the Being 
of some entity and entities come up in perplexing forms. This 
confusing state may dissolve and we can perceive what it 
means "for an entity to relate itself comprehendingly towards 
the Being of any and every entity (including itself), ie. 
toward any manifestation of Being what whatever" only "if we 
can understand the Being of the only entity for whom Being is 
an issue" [ibid.].
Yet another issue Heidegger takes up in relation to any 
enquiry into 'Dasein' is related to 'temporality'. He claims 
that any enquiry starts with an initial envision of its 
general purpose and some features related to the 'object of 
interrogation'. Presuppositions are necessary for setting
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the direction of the enquiry which are important for 
attaining the meaning. Nevertheless, if one wants to hold a 
'transparent' standpoint, one must admit and declare its 
presuppositions. Heidegger in his existential analytic seeks 
to exhibit that the structures that constitute 'Dasein' must 
eventually be elucidated as modes of temporality'. In other 
words, for Heidegger, comprehension of an entity, implicitly, 
by Dasein like Being -that of its own or that of another 
entity- is actualized with time as the viewpoint. If this is 
the case, then one cannot comprehend the meaning of Being 
other than temporality.
Given this, for Heidegger, any enquiry has to understand
itself as temporal, ie. as 'rooted in time'. This is true
for all entities, for that-beings like physical objects and
animals. Dasein, yet, exists;
...it leads a life in which its own Being is an 
issue for it [...] events in its past cannot be 
thought of as having been left behind it [...] .
Dasein does not merely have a past but lives its 
past, it exists in the terms that its past makes 
available for it [...]. [Ibid., 20]
The argument posed for Dasein itself must also hold true 
for Dasein as an ontological enquirer. That is to say.
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Heidegger' s initial approach to Dasein confines him to take 
his own enquiry
...as emerging into a tradition of ontological 
inquiry attempting to advance that tradition, to 
project it into the future; but also as 
ineliminably marked by the history of that 
tradition, as the place in which that history is 
lived out in the present.[ibid.,20-21]
From this approach we understand that Heidegger attempts to
postulate a question which has either been misconstrued or
taken for granted in history. This situation, however, does
not urge Heidegger to reject totally what was done in the
past. As put by Mulhall,
After all, the complete and undiscriminating 
rejection of every possibility that this tradition 
offers would leave him with no orientation for his 
enquiry, with no possible way of carrying on his 
questioning. [Ibid.:21]
Consequently, that which he holds from the philosophical 
past has a positive bearing in two respects as again 
discussed by Mulhall,
First, if Dasein's understanding of Being is 
constitutive of its Being, then I can never 
entirely lose that understanding. It must 
therefore be possible to recover something 
potentially valuable for an ontological enquiry 
from even the most misleading and distortive 
theoretical systems of the philosophical 
tradition. And second, Heidegger never claims
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that every contribution to this tradition was 
benighted; on the contrary, he stresses the 
positive element of relatively recent 
philosophical work [...] and he places particular 
emphasis upon the value of work done at the very 
outset of this tradition in ancient Greece 
(unsurprisingly, since if such work did not 
contain fundamentally sound initial grasp of the 
question of the meaning of Being, nothing 
resembling a tradition of ontological enquiry 
could have originated from it). [Ibid.: 22].
In the foregoing brief account of Heidegger's work Being 
and Time, we see an emphasis on the nature of human
existence.
This emphasis is definitely placed by philosophers 
in the past in form of questions. In that sense 
Heidegger is not working on a genuine project. 
However, what Heidegger does is the framework in 
which he poses his question. His philosophical 
inquiry is actually about Being per se. As such he 
directs the attention of the readers to the 
meaning of Being which is something taken for 
granted [ibid.: 30].
3.2 Introducing the Problem : Heidegger's Point of Departure
In His "The Origin of the Work of Art'
Martin Heidegger's essay "The Origin of the Work of 
Art" begins with his definition of what he means by the word 
'origin': "that from and by which something is what it is
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and as it is" [1971: 17]. Consequently, asking the question 
of the origin of the work of art comes to mean inquiring 
about the source of its nature. Seen from the usual point of 
view the artist seems to be the origin of the work of art; 
however, the same perspective also enables the work to be 
viewed as the origin of the artist. Yet, Heidegger states, 
though the artist and the work cannot be without each other, 
they are not the sole support of each other, either: a third 
term, namely art, is prior to both and gives them their 
names, ” [i]n themselves and in their iqterrelations artist 
and work are each of them by virtue of .. art" [ibid. : 17] . 
Hence, according to Heidegger, that art is the origin of both 
the work and the artist is as equally certain as that the 
work and the artist are the origins of each other though in 
different ways. Whether art can be an origin, where and how 
art occurs needs to be questioned as Heidegger admits, 
nevertheless, he also claims that, no matter what, the 
question of the origin of the work of art becomes a question 
about the nature of art. This last question directs the 
inquiry back to the work of art since "the place where art 
prevails in a real way" is the work of art itself: "[a]rt is 
present in the art work" [ibid.: 18].
60
Apparently, thinking on the question of the origin of
the work of art is caught up in a circle: "What art is
should be inferable from the work. What the work of art is
we can come to know only from the nature of art. Anyone can
easily see that we are moving in a circle" [ibid.]. This
circle, Heidegger continues, is to be avoided according to
ordinary understanding because it violates logic. Then, what
one can do to avoid this circle is either to start with the
proposition that a comparative examination of actual works
can give us what art is, or, to derive the nature of art
from higher concepts. Yet, both procedures, he says, are
equally impossible and if practiced they end up in a self-
deception. The comparative examination of actual works of
art needs to select works from given objects as a result of
which it faces the problem of how to decide for certain if a
work is a work of art without knowing beforehand what art
itself is. The procedure of derivation, too, faces a similar
problem, for it, too, must consider in advance, "the
characteristics that must suffice to establish that" a work
is a work of art [ibid.]. Consequently, Heidegger concludes:
Thus we are compelled to follow the circle. This 
is neither a makeshift nor a defect. To enter 
upon this path is the strength of thought, to 
continue on it is the feast of thought, assuming 
that thinking is a craft. Not only is the main
61
step from work to art a circle like the step from 
art to work but every separate step that we 
attempt circles in this circle [ibid.].
Yes, indeed the reader of Heidegger's essay encounters this 
circle all through, under each subheading, with each step his 
thought takes. It seems appropriate at this point to break 
up with Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art" at its 
introductory state, pause our reading of it at its 
introduction, to follow another text, one by Jacques Derrida, 
where he takes up the issues of the circle, the circular step 
and the form of the question that Heidegger poses.
3.3 The Form of the Question "What is the Origin of the 
Work of Art?"
Questions such as "What is 'art'?", "Where does it come 
from?", "What is the origin of art?" are, as Derrida 
explains, under the title "Lemmata" in his The Truth in 
Painting, the usual questions posed at the beginning of a 
course, a seminar, a discourse on art, for the traditional 
beginning point of a course is "the semantic analysis of its 
title, of the word or concept which entitles it and which can 
legitimate its discourse only by receiving its own 
legitimation from that discourse" [Derrida,1987: 20]. Hence
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the question becomes "What is the origin of the meaning of 
the word 'art'?", and the guiding thread for these questions 
turns out to be the existence of works of art. This is the 
case, Derrida says, in Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics, where 
he claims that the fact that there are works of art, that 
they exist, is presented as an appropriate point of 
departure. Consequently, the question "What is the origin of 
the work of art?" is posed "[a]nd it is not without 
significance that this question gives its title to one of the 
last great discourses on art, that of Heidegger" [ibid.]. 
Following the circling steps of his thinking on art,
Heidegger, too, takes the work of art as his initial point of 
departure. Right after the separate quotation presented in 
the previous paragraph, he proposes to "go to the actual work 
and ask the work what and how it is" with the purpose of 
discovering "the nature of the art that really prevails in 
the work" [Heidegger, 1971: 18].
Derrida makes a warning at this point. He claims that 
such questions predetermine, precomprehend what art is, and 
therefore the answer to them is already provided in the form 
of themselves. And this question form which provides an 
answer ailready also brings into the discourse, establishes in
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it inevitably^ the conceptual oppositions, which have served
to comprehend art traditionally. The example for such
oppositions that Derrida gives is the opposition between
meaning as inner content, and form :
This protocol of the question .. begins by implying... 
that art -the word, the concept, the thing- has a 
unity, and what is more, an originary meaning an 
'etymon' a truth that is 'one' and 'naked', and 
that it would be sufficient to unveil it 'through' 
history. It implies first of all that "art" can be 
reached following the three ways of word, concept, 
and thing, or again of signifier, signified, and 
referent, or even by some opposition between 
presence and representation [Derrida, 1987: 20].
This one-and-naked meaning, that is being sought through such 
questions, informs the historical forms of art (the concepts 
of art, or the words which translate art in different 
languages) from the inside, like a content, and at the same 
time distinguishes itself from these forms it informs. That 
is why, in general, thought on art can not avoid accrediting 
the series of oppositions, i.e. meaning/form, inside/outside, 
content/container, signified/signifier,
represented/representer, etc. which structure the thought on 
art itself as well as the traditional interpretation of works 
of art. Within this perspective, generally, art is made into 
an object in which an inner meaning, the invariant , and a
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multiplicity of external variations are claimed to be 
distinguished. Moreover in a similar gesture, what art means 
to say ('vouloir-dire'* of works of art) is also posed as a 
question "where by the mark 'art' is submitted to a very 
determined regime of interpretation" which has been dominant 
throughout history:
[...] it consists, in its tautology' without reserve, 
in interrogating the 'vouloir-dire' of every work 
of so called art, even if its form is not that of 
saying ... submitting all productions to the 
authority of speech and the "discursive" arts 
[ibid, 22].
That is to say, repeating this question form without 
transforming it, destroying it and its "onto-interrogative" 
structure, allows logocentrism and phonocentrism (ie. the 
deeply rooted prejudice of Western thought and metaphysics 
which had been elaborated on briefly in the previous part of 
this thesis) to be at work in the discourse or thought that 
springs from it. Or rather, through the question, 
logocentricism and phonocentricism are unavoidably implanted 
within the discourse that develops from it. Hence the secret 
and deceitful cooperation between the question and the 
hierarchical classification of the arts. "This", Derrida 
says, "can be verified: teleology and hierarchy are 
prescribed in the envelope of the question" [ibid.]. Both
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Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics and Heidegger's "Origin of the 
Work of Art", according to Derrida, subordinate "all of the 
arts to speech, and, if not to poetry, at least to the poem, 
the said language, speech, nomination (Sage, Dichtung, 
Sprache, Nennen)" [ibid. 23]. (On this point he refers the 
reader to the third and final part of "The Origin of the Work 
of Art" titled "Truth and Art" and we will come to that in a 
while.) Yet, these two discourses, he adds, are very 
different from each other "in their aim, their procedure, 
their style" [ibid.]. While Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics, 
as Derrida states, "gives classical teleology its greatest 
deployment" and "finishes off, as people say too easily, 
onto-theology", Heidegger's "Origin of the Work of Art" 
"attempts, by taking a step backwards, to go behind [or 
beyond] all the oppositions that have commanded the history 
of aesthetics" [ibid.]. And not only these oppositions, but 
also the whole of Western metaphysics and onto-theology, as 
well as, the Hegelian discourse itself [cf. ibid.:29-30].
Then, he asks, how come the above mentioned subordination is
common to both. The answer seems to be provided in the
previous fragment on the same page; because they both 
"exclude -(that) which then comes to form close and bound
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them from inside and outside alike. And if it were a frame"
[ibid.]
3.4 The Figure of the Circle
Derrida points the reader's attention to what he calls 
the "[r]epetition of the Hegelian gesture in the necessity of 
its lemma*" in Heidegger's introduction, namely, the 
repetition of the circle, and, as a result, taking the work 
of art as a legitimate point of departure [ibid.:32]. He also 
points at certain indications, in "The Origin of the Work of 
Art", of the fact that ” [t]he 'Origin' is situated in the 
zone of resonance of Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics" 
[ibid.:29]. Derrida refers to Heidegger's 'Origin' as "one 
of the last great discourses on art", likewise, Heidegger 
refers to Hegel's 'Lectures' as the "most comprehensive 
meditation which the West possesses on the essence of art - 
comprehensive because thought out from metaphysics"
[ibid.:20, 29]. Yet, Heidegger also "works to untie what 
still keeps Hegel's aesthetics on the unperceived ground of 
metaphysics", Derrida explains, "in his 'nonidentical, 
staggered, discrepant 'repetition' of the Hegelian 
'repetition' in the Lectures on Aesthetics" [ibid.30]. And, 
in return, Derrida seems to be pointing at the moments in
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Heidegger's discourse, what still keeps it on the unperceived
ground of metaphysics, or rather, making such points visible,
perceivable. That is why Derrida writes:
[it is] certainly not insignificant that more than 
a century later [after Hegel's discourse on art], 
[Heidegger's] meditation on art begins by turning 
in an analogous circle while pretending to take a 
step beyond or back behind the whole of metaphysics 
or Western onto-theology. [emphasis added] 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' will have taken a 
running start [though repeating this circle] for an 
incommensurable leap [ibid.: 29].
'Pretending', because, as it was explained in the last 
section, according to Derrida, Heidegger's discourse on art 
cannot avoid what still keeps it on the ground of 
metaphysics, either, in the last analysis. Now, for a clearer 
explication of this 'repetition of the Hegelian gesture in 
the necessity of its lemma' in Heidegger's meditation, the 
need to shift to Derrida's presentation of the Hegelian
repetition itself arises.
In the introduction to the Lectures on Aesthetics, the 
point of departure for a philosophical discourse in 
Aesthetics is posed as a question by Hegel. He says that ”on 
a circle of circles, one is justified in starting from any 
point, "that [t]here is no absolute beginning in science"
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[ibid.:28]· Hence his chosen point of departure is, like 
Heidegger's, that "there are works of art .. in front of us in 
[everyday] representation"; that these are to be interrogated 
with the purpose of finding the essence of art in them 
[ibid.]. Hegel is aware of the philosophical insufficiency of 
justification of this lemmatic beginning point, according to 
Derrida, and he also admits that his point of departure is 
vulgar. However, he also provides a justification for it by 
placing art as a circle in the circle of circles; in "the 
circle of the mind and of the philosophical encyclopedia, 
etc." [Ibid.]. Derrida explains that according to Hegel 
there is not such a problem of introduction for mathematical 
or natural sciences, there is no such difficulty for them, 
because, their object of study or interrogation is "given or 
determined in advance "together with the method of 
investigation that the object requires [ibid.:25]. Whereas, 
in the case of the sciences which take the products of the 
mind as their object the "need for an introduction or preface 
makes itself felt" [ibid.: 25-26]. This is the case for 
aesthetics, in other words, for the philosophy or science of 
the beautiful, which, according to Hegel, must exclude 
natural beauty because he thinks of artistic beauty as 
superior to the natural one to the extent of claiming that
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there is no natural beauty. Consequently, the essence of the 
beautiful is linked directly to the essence of art rather 
than nature, in accordance with the determinate opposition of 
mind and nature in which Hegel places priority and 
superiority to the former and its products including art.
Within this perspective, when the mind indulges in
aesthetics, it actually, necessarily, is engaged in one of
its own products, in other words, in "the product of its own
production", that is to say, it is "engaged in a self-
knowledge" [ibid.: 26]. Derrida explains that:
This autodetermination poses singular problems of 
priority. The mind must put itself into its own 
product, produce a discourse on what it produces, 
introduce itself of itself into itself. The 
circular duction, this intro-reduction to oneself, 
calls for what Hegel names a "presupposition"... it 
presupposes itself, anticipates itself, 
precipitates itself... Everything with which it 
commences is already a result, a 'work', an effort 
of a projection of the mind, a 'resultare'. Every 
foundation, every justification (...) will have been 
a result -this is, as you know, the mainspring of 
speculative dialectic. Presuppositions must 
proceed from "a proven and demonstrated necessity" 
explains Hegel. "In philosophy, nothing must be 
accepted which does not possess the character of 
necessity, which means that everything in 
philosophy must have the value of a result."
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We are, right from the introduction, encircled 
[ibid.].
Being one of these productions of mind, art is one of the 
paths through the meditation on which the mind returns to 
itself. By way of thinking on art, then, the mind "comes back 
to consciousness and cognizance and comes to its proper place 
by 'returning' to it in a circle" [ibid.]. Derrida further 
explains that the mind, as Hegel defines it, "is what it is" 
and "says what it means" only by way of this 'returning', 
that is to say, only by way of retracing its own steps in 
this circle.
In passing, I would like to open a bracket here, and 
comment on the expression 'the mind says what it means'.
That both Hegel's and Heidegger's discourses on art 
subordinated all the arts to speech, according to Derrida, 
had already been mentioned earlier. Now, in this passage, 
though not stated explicitly, that logocentricism is at work 
in Hegel's discourse seems to be implied, nevertheless, 
through the use of such expressions as 'the mind becomes what 
it is and 'the mind says what it means'. Because these 
expressions denote, as far as I understand and interpret 
them, the self-presence of speech through which the self is
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self-present to itself -a similar circle at work- which comes 
down to logocentricism. "The origin of philosophy", Derrida 
says elsewhere "is translation or the thesis of 
translatability", ie. the thesis that meaning is utterly 
translatable into language because truth or meaning is before 
or beyond language [Derrida, 1988; 120] . Hence, 'the mind 
says what it means'. Since meaning and truth is given a 
commanding role in this discourse, it follows that "one must 
be able to fix its univocality or, in any case, to master its 
plurivocality", however, " [p]hilosophical discourse cannot 
master a word meaning two things at the same time" [ibid.]. 
Hence, whenever meaning cannot be fixed down, or mastered by 
a discourse, as Derrida demostrates in "Plato's Pharmacy" in 
respect to the word 'pharmakon', "wherever translation in 
this sense has failed, it is nothing less than philosophy 
that finds itself defeated" [ibid.]. Not to go off at a 
tangent, I will close this bracket here and go on with the 
'repetition' of the Hegelian gesture in Heidegger's discourse 
and the figure of the circle.
There are other such circles in the circle of circles 
following which the mind returns back to itself, back to 
consciousness and cognizance, and 'is what it is'. Through a 
chain of circles -for example, through the circle of art, the
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end and truth of which is religion, which itself is another 
circle whose end and truth is philosophy, and so on- the 
circle of circles is reached. In this 'circle of circles^, 
the great circle of the Geist*, of the philosophical 
encyclopedia', 'of philosophy in its totality', each circle 
or ring "turns upon itself and annulling itself it links onto 
other rings", forming the great circle itself, at the same 
time [Derrida, 1987: 26]. Moreover, according to Hegel, what 
"gives us knowledge of the universe as a unique organic 
totality in itself" is only philosophy in its entirety.
Within such concatenation of circles, the movement is not 
uni-directional. The move from a small circle towards the 
circle of circles is as much possible and needed as the move 
from the circle of circles to the former, because, otherwise, 
"this sole world of truth" cannot be contained, retained, and 
gathered together in itself" "without losing anything of what 
makes it a whole" [ibid.]. As a result, the 'circle of 
circles', the philosophical corpus, attains an 'organic' 
totality, whereby, the whole and the parts -that is to say, 
the whole to the parts and the parts to the whole as well as 
to each other- are interlaced to each other necessarily and 
simultaneously. Accordingly, to conceive of the whole, 
recourse to the parts is necessary as to conceive of the 
parts, recourse to the whole is. It follows from his 
circular relation that "[b]efore beginning to speak of the 
beautiful and of the fine arts", the whole of the 'circle of 
circles', 'philosophy in its entirety' needs to have been 
developed, already [ibid.]. And, at the same time, art
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happens to be one of those circles beginning with which, 
through interlacing, the 'great circle of circles' is arrived 
at. This is where the necessity of the 'leituna' comes into 
picture:
... the concept of the beautiful and of art is "a 
presupposition given by the system of philosophy. 
Philosophy alone can pose the question "what is 
beautiful" and answer it: the beautiful is a 
production of art, ie., of the mind. The idea of 
beauty is given to us by art, that circle inside 
the circle of the mind and of the philosophical 
encyclopedia, etc. [ibid.].
In short, it is this system of circle of circles formed by 
way of the inter-relations and interlacing between the parts 
and the whole, as explained above, which allows, and 
justifies Hegel's assertion that 'there is no absolute 
beginning in science', hence 'on a circle of circles one is 
justified in starting from any point' lemmatically, and 
necessarily so. Consequently, when art is the case, the 
lemma that 'there are works of art' appears as a necessary 
point of departure.
Following all of these threads from Hegel's discourse on 
art, Derrida makes a few comments, or at least comes up with 
certain implications. The ensuing conclusions can perhaps be 
drawn from these:
1. It was said that Hegel recognizes his point of departure 
as vulgar, yet justifies his lemmatic precipitation by
74
recourse to the metaphor of circle of circles. However, 
Derrida says, this justification does not solve the problem 
of how to recognize the works of art as works of art fully. 
That is why, in Hegel's discourse, "[a]t each step, at each 
example, in the absence of enormous theoretical, juridical, 
political, etc. protocols, there is a trembling of the limit 
between the 'there is' and 'there is not' 'work of art' 
between a 'thing' and a 'work' in general and 'work of art'." 
[ibid.;28-29]. (The 'there is', here, also seems to be caught 
in the problematic opened by Heidegger through 'es gibt Sein' 
-'there is Being' or more literally 'it gives Being' [cf. the 
discussion on 'mise en abyme' ibid.; 27].)
2. As explained in the previous section, the repetition of 
the question-form without being transformed or destroyed 
would already subject "the whole space to the discursive 
arts, to voice and the 'logos'" ie. to 'phonocentricism' and 
'logocentricism', and from this would follow hierarchy and 
teleology [ibid./22]. And we witness this happening in 
Hegel's discourse on art. Hierarchy follows from his 
discourse necessarily because of the system of circle of 
circles whereby philosophy in its entirety is given the 
highest and all encompassing position. Likewise, teleology, 
too, is inherent to this discourse by way of the circle of 
circles and its inner workings. If we recall Hegel's 
assertion that 'everything in philosophy must have the value 
of a result,' it will be clearly visible that teleology is at 
work right from the beginning. Similarly, the annular
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concatenation of circles, too, works towards an end: the 
forming of the circle of circles. The important point 
Derrida makes in relation to 'teleology' here is that, 
accordingly, in Hegel's discourse on art, 'art is studied 
from the point of view of its end. Its pastness is its 
truth". All this brings Hegel to make the following 
proposition in Lectures on Aesthetics which Derrida quotes 
from Heidegger who in turn quotes from Hegel:
But we no longer have an absolute need to bring a 
content to presentation in the form of art. Art, 
from the aspect of its highest destination, is for 
us something past [ibid.; 29].
3. Hegel inevitably has recourse to the metaphor of the 
circle of circles to justify his lemmatic point of departure. 
This metaphor, Derrida says, is an organic metaphor in that 
it refers to a whole, the parts of which conspire to attain 
that totality. What is interesting in this metaphor of 
circle of circles is that it is also a metaphor for art and 
work of art. Because Hegel also says that the circle of 
circles is only a representation itself. Moreover, he 
describes philosophy in its totality as a work of art. Such 
description makes of the circle of art which Hegel places in 
his great circle of circles, not only a model as such, but 
also, at the same time, greater than the whole it happens to
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be a part of. On such an organization, Derrida makes the
comment that "the philosophical encloses art in its circle
but its discourse on art is at once, by the same token caught
in a circle" [ibid.:23]. He further explains that in order
for the inscription of a circle in another to be abyssal, to
be a 'mise en abyme'*, the smallest circle must inscribe in
itself the figure of the largest. Something like a 'mise en
abyme' seems to be taking place in Hegel's metaphor of the
circle of circles, but Derrida deliberately refrains from
putting it in a proposition such as "this is an abyss or a
'mise en abyme'" because he says this proposition will
immediately be caught up in the problematic of the 'es gibt'
and 'es gibt Sein'; there is, and there is Being, opened up
by Heidegger. He rather states that such a proposition.
Arrests the abyss, unless it be already dragged 
down into it... a proposition of [this] type appears 
to destroy the instability of the relations of the 
whole to part, the indecision of the structures of 
inclusion which throw 'en abyme' [ibid.:27].
Hence, Derrida, though not making explicit comments 
implicitly refers to what is at work in this organization of 
circle of circles. It would not be wrong, I believe, to read 
between the lines on Hegel's discourse on art a certain
blindness to the aporia.
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CONCLUSION
“Lemmata" in The Truth in Painting by Derrida, allows 
for such an experience of reading that the reader falls into 
the position of making their own decisions and comments, 
offering their own interpretations or points and driving 
their own conclusions on the issues pointed to by it. The 
text guides the reader in a certain manner but does it quite 
implicitly, through implicit references to other texts by 
Derrida. It seems that in this essay, Derrida deliberately 
refrains from making explicitly assertive generalizations and 
ultimate points, which would dominate the text in the last 
analysis. He focuses especially on the verb 'leave' in 
expressions like 'let's leave it' almost at the end of each 
argument leaving the conclusion and the decision open to the 
reader's interpretation. He takes up this phrase itself and 
offers possible meanings to it in question form (cf. p.29). 
Does 'leave' mean allow to see or be seen, or does it mean 
allow to do or be done, or cause something to be done, or
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leave as a remainder? He does not answer these questions and 
leaves even that to the reader. Consequently, I will take 
the liberty here to pose his assertion that
...these two discourses [Heidegger's and Hegel's] 
have in common, as a common interest, that they 
exclude - (that) which then comes to form close 
and bound them from inside and outside alike .. 
[Derrida, 1987b: 23].
as a question. He gives a clue though; immediately after this 
vague assertion that he puts forth, he says ” [a]nd if it were 
a frame ". I will attempt to provide here one possible 
answer.
Both Hegel and Heidegger start with the question of the 
artwork but arrive at conclusions where they subordinate art 
to discursive arts, ie. speech. It is interesting that this 
happens because they both share the intention of going beyond 
metaphysics and its oppositions. Hegel subordinates art to 
philosophy but at the same time through his metaphor of 
circle of circles contradicts this subordination by asserting 
that the circle of circles as itself is a work of art.
Whereas, the metaphor of the circle of circles even shows 
that the circle of circles is rather subordinated to art. 
Heidegger on the other hand attempts to go beyond all the
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metaphysical binary oppositions in his search for the origin 
of the work of the art, and derives the conclusion that it is 
truth, ie. aletheia. However, by the same gesture he also 
subordinates art in general to the art of poetry.
To bind the loose ends, if such an endeavour is ever 
possible, in the light of the foregoing parts of this thesis 
it would not be wrong to conclude that one possible answer to 
what both these discourses exclude and what comes in to form, 
close and bound them is that it is their overlooking of the 
violence inherent in the metaphysical binary oppositions. 
Earlier on we had said that such overlooking left the field 
of these binary opposition intact, hence, operating as a 
frame which comes to delimit these binary oppositions. Not 
thinking the aporia aporetically, as was explained in the 
second part of this thesis, may be thought to be the reason 
for such overlooking, as well. Then, it may even be concluded 
that it is this not thinking the aporia aporetically that 
which comes to frame these two discourses on art alike. It 
must be noted here that when Derrida uses the term 'aporia', 
he does not use it in the sense presocratics had used it, ie. 
to refer to "an oscillation between two contradictory 
sayings", to the suspension of judgment as a result of the
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inability to ground either sayings [Beardsworth, 1996:32]. He 
rather uses this term to refer to the condition of 
possibility of ideality that happens to be, at the same time, 
the condition of its impossibility. In other words, Derrida 
uses 'aporia' to refer to "the contradiction [which] applies 
to one and the same entity, not to two different 
entities"[ibid.]. Being as such 'aporia' does not suspend 
judgment but rather it is the source and possibilty of all 
judgment, and also of framing in this sense. As Beardswoth
explains
No judgment is possible without the experience of 
aporia. Whether one recognizes this experience of 
aporia or not, whether one takes this experience 
into account or not, is another matter. The 
difference of not doing so and doing so develops 
the difference between metaphysics and 
deconstruction.[ibid.: 33]
Hence, it would not be wrong here to conclude that the 
desire to posit an ultimate origin, an ultimate meaning, to 
find the essence, is due to this experince of the aporia. 
However, the overlooking of the violence that is already 
inherent in it, results in a more violent framing into binary 
oppositions. That is why, always holding on to the limits.
81
deconstruction comes in to unframe, yet only for a lesser
violence.
One final remark, which needs to be made in this 
conclusion, is related to the far reaching purpose of this 
thesis stated in the introduction, that is to make a research 
on 'graphic novels' and using the conclusions drawn in this 
thesis as a starting point. Graphic novels do attract the 
attention of the reader to the problem of the pictorial 
frame, which, of course, they can not do without. It can be 
said that they problematize the frame and framing in general. 
It is hoped that this study will help to clarify what takes 
place in graphic novels as to the frame and framing; whether 
they adopt a deconstructive approach in relation to the frame 
or just problematize it; if they can be deconstructed or not. 
All this will require future work on which this study is 
hoped to shed a light on.
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GLOSSARY
Aporia
The "Greek word for seemingly insoluble logical 
difficulty"(Bass, 1995:xvi-xvii).
Archia
" [R]egulation by true original principles...[D]erives 
from the Greek 'arche', which combines the senses of 
founding original principle and government by one 
controlling principle"( Bass, 1995:xvi-xvii).
Dasein
Literally means 'there-being'. One of the reasons why 
Heidegger chooses this term is because in daily German 
usage this term refers to human beings in regard to the 
type of Being that is distinctive of them thus preparing 
Heidegger the valid ontological basis. Another reason is 
hat 'Dasein' permits Heidegger not to use terms which 
may be taken as equivalent to 'human being' and used by 
oher philosophers. One other reason is that this term 
lacks misleading associations.
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^ii;^semination
What Derrida means by the 'disseminating' force, which 
is always at work in both -iritten and spdken language, 
is the intertextuality of any sort of texts; they bear 
along with them a whole network of themes and 
assumptions whose meaning links up with other texts, 
other genres or topics of discourse [c.f. Norris, 
1987:25-26].
Also the title of one of Derrida's books: Dissemination, 
where, among other essays "Plato's Pharmacy" is 
published.
"This book begins with a denial of the book and of 
the beginning. The opening sentence 'This 
(therefore) will not have been a book'...[in the 
preface] situated both inside and outside, both 
before and after the 'book' whose 'book-ness' it 
both promotes and transgresses, .. has always 
inscribed itself in a strange warp of both time 
and space.... The Book, the Preface, and the 
Encyclopedia are all structures of unification and 
totalization. Dissemination on the other hand, is 
what subverts all such recuperative gestures of 
mastery. It is what foils the attempt to progress 
in an orderly way toward meaning or knowledge, 
what breaks the circuit of intentions or 
expectations through some ungovernable excess or 
loss.... the most compelling achievement of 
Dissemination,..., lies .. in its inscription of the 
ways in which all theoretical discourse-including 
its own-forever remains both related and 
precipitous with respect to the textual practice 
it attempts to comprehend."(Johnson, 1993:xxxii- 
xxxiii)
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Eidos
'truth, law", "model-form, shape" [Derrida, 1993: 159].
Epokhe
Husserlian term for the bracketing or putting to play 
"that constitutes phenomenological reduction" [Spivak, 
tr.note, 1976:43]
Geist
The German word for 'spirit'. And also 'revenant', 
'ghost', 'guest' etc. according to Derrida; a visitor.
Grammatology
"A treatise upon letters, upon the alphabet, 
syllabation, reading and writing" Littré. [Derrida, 
1976: 323].
Lemma
Is the singular form of 'lemmata' which happens to be 
the title of one of Derrida's essays referred to in this 
part. It means a subsidiary proposition introduced in 
providing some other proposition: a helping theorem.
Logocentri sm
That which is "centred" on the "Logos". The term that 
Derrida uses for the belief in self-present meaning 
which also is the underlying ideal of Western
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metaphysics and culture-from the Greek word "Logos", 
which means speech, logic, reason, the Word of God [cf. 
Johnson, 1993:ix, 4].
"... [T]he belief that the first and last things are 
the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the infinite 
understanding of God, an infinitely creative 
subjectivity, and, closer to our time, the self­
presence of full self-consciousness ..
[L]ogocentrism relates to centrism itself-the 
human desire to posit a "central" presence at 
beginning and end .. It is this longing for a 
centre, an authorising pressure, that spawns 
hierarchized oppositions [binary oppositions such 
as intelligible/sensible, soul/body, meaning/word, 
speech/writing, where the first term of the 
opposition is given privilege over the other]. The 
superior term belongs to presence and the logos; 
the inferior serves to define its status and mark 
a fall" (Spivak, 1976:Ixviii-lxix).
Mi se -en- abyme
"The abyssal effect by which a represented 
object, scene, et cetera, already figures within 
the frame of the representation, thus precluding 
the idea of any original moment or space that is 
outside the frame. It would be the effect, for 
example, of a painting of a gallary wall on which 
hung the painting of the gallary wall.-Tr." 
[Derrida, 1985:62 fn].
Pharmakon
Mrug' meaning both poison and remedy.
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Vouloir-dire
Derrida explains: "I justify the translation of 
'bedeuten' by ~ [meaning, literally "wish-to-say" in 
Speech and Phenomena" [1976: 326] .
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